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Abstract
In smart grid, bi-directional information exchange among customers, operators and control devices
significantly improves the efficiency of energy supplying and consuming. However, integration of
intelligence and cyber systems into a power grid can lead to serious cyber security challenges and
makes the overall system more vulnerable to cyber attacks. To address this challenging issue, this
article presents defense mechanisms to either protect the system from attackers in advance or detect
the existence of data injection attacks to improve the smart grid security. Focusing on signal processing
techniques, this article introduces an adaptive scheme on detection of injected bad data at the control
center. This scheme takes the power measurements of two sequential data collection slots into account,
and detects data injection attacks by monitoring the measurement variations and state changes between
the two time slots. The proposed scheme has the capability of adaptively detecting attacks including both
non-stealthy attacks and stealthy attacks. Stealthy attacks are proved impossible to be detected using
conventional residual-based methods, and can cause more dangerous effects to power systems than non-
stealthy attacks. It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can also be used for attack classification
to help system operators prioritize their actions to better protect their systems, and is therefore very
valuable in practical smart grid systems.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Smart grid is a modernized power grid that uses information and communications technol-
ogy to gather and act on information for improving the efficiency, robustness, economics, and
sustainability of the energy distribution and management [1]. The bi-directional information
exchange among customers, operators and control devices offers a more efficient way of energy
supplying and consuming: On the operator side, equipment can be intelligently managed and
energy supplying flexibility can be significantly improved. On the consumer side, both the
user experience and billing system can be enhanced [2]. The data generated in a smart grid is
much more than that generated in a traditional power grid due to this continuous bi-directional
information exchange [3], [4]. The Internet of Things (IoT) enables the transfer of such high
volume data, and makes the grid infrastructure, meters, substations, and buildings virtually
interconnected through the Internet or peer-to-peer connections [5]. IoT can be a valuable solution
to support the development of smart grid.
However, by integrating a physical system (power grid) with a cyber system (IoT), a smart grid
presents significant cyber security challenges and makes the overall system more vulnerable to
cyber-attacks. For instance, in December 2015, a cyber attack of a power system was reported
in Ukraine, which caused a power cut lasting several hours and affecting 80,000 customers.
During the attack, 103 cities were completely blacked out and the affected control centers were
not fully operational even after two months later. In addition, according to data provided by
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, there were 79 cyber hacking incidents
targeted at the energy sector in the year 2014 [6]. Such attacks could maliciously manipulate
the electricity price in the power market, or even cause a regional blackout (taking Ukraine as
an example), and result in serious social and economic consequences. Thus, IoT-enabled smart
grids must incorporate appropriate cyber protection mechanisms for detecting and identifying
such malicious data attacks to improve the smart grid security.
To maintain normal operations of the smart grid, the power systems are continuously monitored
and controlled by Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and Energy
Management Systems (EMS) [7]. In particular, the SCADA host receives real-time measurements
(typically transmission line power flows and bus line power flows) from remote meters or sensors.
These measurements are then processed at the state estimator for estimating the system states
and building real-time electricity network models [8]. These state estimates are crucial, and must
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3be passed to enable EMS application functions, such as automatic generation control and optimal
power flow, to control the physical aspects of power grids. We consider a smart grid comprising
the power system, communication network, and control center. An attacker may launch attacks
by hacking a few meters or sensors to distort the measurements. Moreover, the communication
links are also vulnerable to data injection attacks where measurements may be altered during
data transmission [9]. Bad data injection attacks can result in the state estimator producing
incorrect system state estimates, leading to poor control decisions or a major malfunction or
even blackout. Other, non-malicious, events can also result in a bad data injection. For example,
an accident such as a tree falling on a transmission line will cause a sudden and large change
in some measurements. Such an event is referred to as an accident, which is also a type of data
injection. It is desirable to protect power systems from data injection attacks in advance or detect
bad data during the state estimation process at the control center.
In this article, we focus on data injection attacks and defense mechanisms in smart grid
networks. Some preliminary works that include the problem formulation of state estimation and
types of attacks are studied. Depending on whether the power grid topology information is
known or not by attackers, data injection attacks are divided into two types, stealthy attacks
and non-stealthy attacks, respectively. We then investigate defense mechanisms to protect power
systems from these attacks. Traditionally, stealthy attacks are impossible to be detected using
conventional residual-based methods. We thus introduce a novel scheme to adaptively detect
and classify data injection attacks including both non-stealthy attacks and stealthy attacks. This
scheme takes the measurements of two sequential data collection slots into account, and detects
data injection attacks by monitoring the measurement variations and state changes between
the two time slots. Using this scheme, once the attack type is identified, system operators can
prioritize their actions or resources to better protect their systems and reduce the risk of attackers
launching future stealthy attacks.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: We first present the system architecture and
introduce state estimation and data attacks in smart grid. Two categories of defense mechanisms
are then discussed. After that, we propose an adaptive scheme on detection of data injection
attacks, and demonstrate the benefits of this scheme compared with conventional methods. Finally
this article is concluded.
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4II. STATE ESTIMATION AND DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
In this section, we illustrate the system architecture and introduce the problem formulation of
state estimation. Two types of data injection attacks, non-stealthy attacks and stealthy attacks,
are then defined.
A. System Architecture
Fig. 1 shows a block architecture diagram of a power system, communication network, and
control center of a smart grid. In order to clearly demonstrate the power system, a small-scale
IEEE 9-bus system is employed which consists of three different types of power generators and
three various loads. The power system is monitored by a control system, which comprises a
SCADA host and a remote sensing system providing power measurement data to the SCADA
host via a communication network. The remote sensing system comprises a plurality of remote
sensors or meters. As shown in Fig. 1, the remote sensors come in two varieties: transmission
line flow sensors, which measure the power flow through a single transmission line, and bus
injection sensors, which measure the power injection flow from all transmission lines connected to
a single bus. At one data collection slot, the measurements from these sensors will be transmitted
through a communication network. Wireless communication network is considered in Fig. 1, as
it can offer wide spread access, great flexibility, and quick deployment. WiMAX or cellular
network communications (e.g., 3G or 4G) can provide the wireless communication solutions
[2]. In the control center, the real-time power measurements received by the SCADA host are
then processed at the state estimator to estimate the system states and build real-time electricity
network models. As shown in Fig. 1, an attacker may launch a data injection attack by hacking
a few sensors to distort the measurements, or alter measurements during their transmission in
the communication links.
B. State Estimation
At the control center, operators need to know the voltage phase angles of all buses to make
control and operation decisions. However, it is difficult for sensors to directly measure phase
angles [10]. The control center thus uses state estimation technique to estimate the system states
(typically voltage phase angles) through processing the set of real-time power measurements
received from sensors.
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5In power systems, the transmitted power from one bus to another bus depends on the voltage
amplitudes and voltage phase differences between the two buses, and also relates to the reactance
of the transmission line between these buses. In power flow analysis, it is usually considered that
the voltage phase differences are relatively small and the voltage amplitudes are normalized to
unit [8], such that a linear relation exists between the power measurement and the voltage phase
difference. We thus apply a linearized power flow model, which is widely used for real-time
analysis of state estimation in the power systems [11].
Using the linearized power flow model, the received power measurements at the SCADA host
can be represented in a vector-matrix from as z = Hx + u, where z denotes the measurement
vector, which includes power flow measurements on transmission lines and power injection
measurements at buses. The system state vector is represented by x, and the vector u represents
the Gaussian noise with a zero mean and a covariance matrix U. The matrix H is the measurement
matrix, which is assumed to be fully known to the system operators; Attackers may or may
not know this measurement matrix [11]. In the power system, the network connectivity can
be described by an oriented incidence matrix M; each column of M corresponds to one power
transmission line, and the number of rows represents the number of buses. The physical properties
of the transmission lines can be described by a nonsingular diagonal matrix N, of which diagonal
entries equal to admittances of the transmission lines. The matrix H can be constructed by
H = [NMT, MNMT]T [9]. That is, power flow measurements on transmission lines are obtained
from MNMTx and power injection measurements at buses can be computed from NMTx.
State estimation is to use the received measurements z to timely estimate the power sys-
tem states x. The vector x can be computed using the weighted least-square method: xˆ =
(HTUH)−1HTUz.
C. Non-stealthy Attacks and Stealthy Attacks
If a bad data injection attack occurs, the received power measurement vector will include a
bad data vector maliciously injected by the attacker. That is, z = Hx+a+u, where a denotes the
bad data vector. Conventional methods to detect bad data injection are mostly based on residual
tests. The residual refers to the difference between the measurement vector z and the calculated
value from the estimated state, i.e., z − Hxˆ. The largest normalized residual test can be used
to detect bad data injection to see if the largest absolute value of the elements in normalized
residual is greater than a pre-defined threshold. If the largest normalized residual is larger than
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6the threshold, the corresponding measurement will be considered as bad data and reported to
system operators.
Depending on whether the bad data attacks detectable or not by conventional residual tests,
we define the following two types of attacks:
1) Non-stealthy Data Injection Attacks: They are defined as the attacks detectable by con-
ventional residual-test methods [8]. In this case, the measurement matrix H is not known to
the attackers. The attackers simply generate random attack vectors and manipulate the meter
readings.
2) Stealthy Data Injection Attacks: They are defined as the attacks not detectable by conven-
tional bad data detection methods. In this case, attackers are assumed to be familiar with the
power grid topology information or know the measurement matrix. They can carefully design the
malicious data and let a = Hc, where c ∈ Rn can be any arbitrary vector [12]. The measurement
vector can then be written as z = H(x+c)+u. Such attacks can bypass the conventional residual-
test detection methods, and the control center would believe that the true state is (x + c).
III. DEFENSE MECHANISMS
Since bad data injection attacks can result in poor control decisions or a major malfunction or
even blackout, it is crucially important to have appropriate defense mechanisms, to either protect
the system from attackers in advance or identify the existence of bad data injection attacks during
the state estimation process [9]. Defense mechanisms can be divided into two categories: One
is to deploy advanced measurement units, such as phasor measurement units (PMUs), at various
locations to protect the system from attackers in advance; The other is to adopt advanced signal
processing techniques at the control center to identify bad data injection attacks.
A. Deployment of Advanced Measurement Units
The mechanisms of deploying advanced measurement units, such as PMUs, are introduced
in [13]–[15]. PMUs measure voltages and currents on a power grid using a common time
source based on global positioning system (GPS) time, and thus have the capability of providing
accurately time-stamped measurements for geographically dispersed nodes. Consequently, PMUs
are typically robust against data injection attacks and have the measurements secured. In practice,
PMUs are very expensive; it is not feasible to deploy enough PMUs to secure all measurements
in a grid network. It is demonstrated in [14] that it is possible to defend against malicious data
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7injection by either protecting a subset of existing measurements, or placing additional secure
PMUs on a fraction of buses. The challenge, however, is that selecting such subsets is a high-
complexity problem and recent studies have proposed several methods on how to address this
issue: For instance, [14] proposes a fast greedy algorithm to select a subset of measurements to
be protected; [13] uses graphical characterization to study defending mechanisms with minimum
number of secure measurements; and [15] provides a semidefinite programming optimal PMU
layout approach considering the impact of restricted channel limits. Due to the high cost, the
approach of deploying advanced measurement units to defense data injections will be more
suitable to power systems that have great social and economic impacts; but for a general power
system it will be restricted by limited budget.
B. Adoption of Signal Processing Techniques
The mechanisms investigating advanced signal processing techniques are to detect the injected
bad data at the control center and abandon these data from measurements. The attack detector
(as shown in Fig. 1) needs to reliably detect an data injection attack in an event of an attack.
Either there is an attack event occurred or there is not. Either the detector identifies an attack or
does not. There are four possible outcomes: hit (attack presents and the detector identifies), miss
(attack presents and the detector fails to identify), false alarm (attack absents and the detector
wrongly identifies), and correct rejection (attack absents and the detector identifies no attack).
We define probability of detection to indicate the first case, and probability of false alarm to
indicate the probability of the third case. The two probabilities can be used as indicators to
compare the performance of different detection methods.
As we mentioned in Section II-C, conventional methods to detect bad data are mostly based
on residual tests. When stealthy data injection attack happens, the residual would not change
compared to the no-attack case, and the system would not report any abnormal state. Besides
conventional methods, some other advanced signal processing techniques are considered to
improve the detection accuracy: In [12], machine-learning (ML) technique is proposed for
detecting stealthy attacks. This ML technique relies on a set of historical data that is used
for learning and validating data to detect the attacks in new measurements, and the learning
efficiency needs to be improved. A cumulative-sum-based (CS) approach is proposed in [8]
aiming to minimize the detection time subject to certain detection error constraints; but this
CS approach focuses on non-stealthy attacks. Exploiting the low rank structure of temporal
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8erroneous-free measurements and sparsity of malicious attacks, defense mechanisms are proposed
in [10] and [9], where methods of constructing sparse stealthy attacks are also studied in [9];
these mechanisms have a strong assumption that the attack matrix must be spare, which is not
robust against attackers with strong capability of launching cyber attacks. One novel mechanism
to adaptively detect and classify data injection attacks (including non-stealthy attacks and stealthy
attacks) will be presented next.
IV. AN ADAPTIVE SCHEME ON DETECTION OF DATA INJECTIONS
In this section, an adaptive scheme on detection of data injections is presented. It takes the
measurements of two sequential data collection slots into account, and the equation of received
measurements can be written as state-space equations with discrete time index i, as zi = Hxi+ui
and xi = xi−1+∆xi, where ∆xi is the state change vector representing the system state changes
from the last data collection slot i− 1 to the current data collection slot i. Current smart meters
support 15-minute-interval data collection frequency, and the frequency is likely to improve
further for achieving advanced smart grid functionalities. Compared with the values of system
state, the values of system state changes are relatively small, that is, the system state generally
varies in a small dynamic range. The state change vector ∆xi follows a certain distribution and
is here initialized to be normal distribution with zero mean. In addition, as the measurement
matrix H is related to the power network connectivity and physical properties of the transmission
lines, H generally remains unchanged for the two small sequential data collection slots. Any
updates of the measurement matrix will be reported to the control center and the updated one
will be used for state estimation and attack detection.
We monitor measurement change residual and state change between two data collection
slots to detect and classify non-stealthy and stealthy data injection attacks. Let wi present the
measurement change vector, which is the difference between the current power flow measurement
vector and the calculated value of the last estimated state, i.e., wi = zi−Hxˆi−1. We can compute
the last estimated state using the weighted least-square method shown in Section II-B, and
obtain wi = H∆xi + (ui − ui−1). As ui and ui−1 are independent Gaussian noise vectors at
the two sequential data collection slots, (ui − ui−1) is also Gaussian distributed with a zero
mean and a covariance matrix 2U. The state change vector can then be estimated from the
measurement change vector wi, by using the weighted least-square method. Furthermore, we
define the measurement change residual vector ri = wi − H∆xˆi, and compute its Euclidean
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9norm to detect the presence of non-stealthy data injection attack. That is, if the Euclidean norm
of ri is greater than a pre-defined threshold τ1, the presence of non-stealthy data injection will be
inferred and reported to system operators. Note that the Euclidean norm is also called ℓ2 distance
or ℓ2 norm. Besides Euclidean norm test, other test method on the residual (e.g., the largest
normalized residual test) can also be used to detect the presence of non-stealthy data injection.
The selection of the threshold τ1 is based on history and trade-off between the probability of
detection and probability of false alarm. In addition, if no data injection is inferred, i.e., the
Euclidean norm of ri is equal to or less than τ1, we use the Euclidean norm of state change
∆xˆi to detect the presence of stealthy data injection attack. If the Euclidean norm of ∆xˆi is
greater than a pre-defined threshold τ2, the presence of stealthy data injection will be inferred
and reported to system operators.
When attackers launch stealthy data injection, we have the state change vector as ∆xi + ci,
compared to ∆xi for the non-attack case. Due to the facts that the vector ∆xi + ci does not
exhibit the same distribution feature as the vector ∆xi, using detection algorithms, the existence
of ci can be detected at a certain successful probability. The detection probability of the proposed
scheme will be higher if the elements of ci are larger. A stealthy attack with larger ci can cause
greater system state change, and thus is more dangerous to the power system operations.
Referring to Algorithm 1, the steps of the proposed scheme are as follows: We initialize time
index i = 0, collect historical estimated state vector xˆ0. Then the procedure of detection for
bad data attacks or electrical accidents is carried out: The time index is updated as i = i + 1,
and the current measurement vector zi sent by remote sensors is obtained. We calculate the
measurement change vector wi, which is the difference between the vector zi and Hxˆi−1. The
state change vector ∆xˆi is estimated from wi, by using the weighted least-square method. We
then calculate the measurement change residual vector ri, which is the difference between the
vector wi and H∆xˆi. As shown in Step II-6 of Algorithm 1, data attacks are then identified
based on the estimated state change vector ∆xˆi and the measurement change residual vector ri
by using the Euclidean norm method. Here the largest normalized method (which compares the
largest absolute value of elements in a vector with a threshold) can also be used. Data attacks
will be classified into non-stealthy attack, stealthy attack, or no attack. If no attack is identified,
the process of state estimation will continue. If non-stealthy or stealthy attack is determined,
the process of attack detection will be terminated and the detected data injection attack will be
reported to system operators. In Step IV, for distinguishing between data injection attacks and
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electrical accidents, system operators can either send staff to verify or wait for receiving reports
from secure devices, such as from PMUs or intelligent electronic devices.
The proposed scheme differs from existing relevant methods in three aspects: First, different
from related works that only process measurements collected at one single time slot, this scheme
takes the measurements of two sequential data collection slots into account, and detects injection
attacks by monitoring the measurement variations and state changes between the two slots. Next,
the proposed scheme can self-adaptively detect both non-stealthy and stealthy injection attacks;
the latter one was proved impossible to detect using conventional methods. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme can identify the type of data attacks. Since stealthy attacks are more dangerous
to power system operations than the non-stealthy ones, it is crucial for operators to know the
attack type and then prioritize their actions or resources to better protect their systems and reduce
the chance of future stealthy attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of conventional detection method and the proposed
scheme for detecting both non-stealthy and stealthy attacks based on IEEE test systems. The
MATLAB package MATPOWER is used to simulate the operation of the power system. The
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) considered in the simulations indicates the power level of true
measurements to the power level of noise. For bad data injection attacks, both non-stealthy
and stealthy attacks of various attack severity levels are considered. The attack-to-noise ratio
(ANR) is used to indicate the attack severity level, defined as the ratio of attack power level
to the noise power level. We use receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves to illustrate the
performance of a detector as the discrimination threshold is varied. The curve is generated by
plotting the probability of detection against the probability of false alarm at various threshold
settings. The probability of detection indicates the probability of saying that an ‘attack’ is present
given that an ‘attack’ event actually occurred. The probability of false alarm is the probability
of saying that an ‘attack’ is present given that a ‘no attack’ event actually occurred.
Referring again to the IEEE 9-bus test system and power system shown in Fig. 1, there are 9
transmission lines and thus 18 measurement elements in total for one data collection slot. Fig. 2
(a) shows the ROC curves of conventional residual-test method, where SNR = 20 dB and ANR
= 10 dB for both non-stealthy and stealthy attacks are considered. For non-stealthy data attacks,
the attacker controls two sensors to inject bad data. From the figure, it can be seen that the
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conventional method can detect non-stealthy attacks at a successful radio of around 85% given
a 10% probability of false alarm. However, for stealthy attack, a completely random guess line
(the same as coin tossing, i.e. the diagonal line from the left bottom to the top right corner) is
obtained, which means the conventional residual-test method cannot detect stealthy attacks but
just always makes a random guessing decision.
For comparison, based on the same IEEE 9-bus test system, detection performance of the
proposed scheme to adaptively detect both non-stealthy and stealthy attacks is demonstrated
in Fig. 2 (b), where a same value of SNR = 20 dB as used in Fig. 2 and various values of
ANR are considered. When ANR = 10 dB, compared to the conventional method, the proposed
scheme can achieve the same detection probability for detecting non-stealthy attacks, and can
significantly improve the detection probability for detecting stealthy attacks; For example, given a
10% probability of false alarm, the proposed scheme can successfully detect non-stealthy attacks
at a radio of around 86%. Different attack levels, i.e., ANR equals 12 dB and 6 dB, are also
considered in Fig. 2 (b). With a higher attack level, regardless non-stealthy or stealthy attack,
better detection performance can be achieved using the proposed scheme. It can be anticipated
that the proposed scheme is valuable in practical power systems to detect higher level of attack,
since higher level of attack can always cause larger system state change and is thus more
dangerous to the power system operations.
In an IEEE 14-bus test system, there are 20 transmission lines, and thus 34 measurement
elements. Fig. 3 shows detection performance of the proposed scheme for IEEE 14-bus test
system, where SNR = 20 dB and various values of ANR are considered. For non-stealthy data
attacks, we still assume that two sensors are attacked to inject bad data. The proposed scheme
can classify and self-adaptively detect both the non-stealthy and stealthy data injection attacks.
A random guess line is also shown to present the ROC curve achieved using the conventional
method when detecting stealthy attacks. The ROC curves obtained using the proposed scheme
are all above the diagonal line, which means that the scheme can achieve very good results
for classifying and detecting attacks (significantly better than random guessing). For the stealthy
data injection attacks (which are hard to be detected using conventional methods), three different
levels of ANR are considered. As the attack power level increased, detection performance
of the proposed scheme improved significantly. The proposed scheme also shows very good
performance on detecting non-stealthy attacks.
An IEEE 57-bus test system has 80 transmission lines and thus 137 measurement elements.
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Using the same setting of SNR = 20 dB as used for IEEE 9-bus and 14-bus systems, detection
performance of the proposed scheme for the IEEE 57-bus system is presented in Fig. 4 against
various values of ANR. The performance of conventional method for detecting stealthy data
attacks is also shown for comparison. Two specific probabilities of false alarm, i.e., 30% and 40%
are considered. For a given probability of false alarm, at a fixed ANR level, the discrimination
threshold τ1 used for testing non-stealthy data attacks and τ2 used for testing stealthy data
attacks can be computed. Using these thresholds τ1 and τ2, the proposed scheme can classify and
detect both the non-stealthy and stealthy attacks. When ANR = 12 dB, to achieve a probability
of detection higher than 85% for detecting stealthy attacks, we must tolerate a false-alarm
probability of up to 40%. A larger value of ANR leads to a much higher detection probability.
As demonstrated in IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus and 57-bus test systems, it can be anticipated that the
proposed scheme is able to achieve the important objectives of smart grid security in terms of
data attack identification and accurate detection.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have discussed bad data injection attacks and defense mechanisms in smart
grid networks. The problem formulation of state estimation and two types of data injection
attacks have been studied. Then, focusing on defense mechanisms, it has been demonstrated that
stealthy data attacks are impossible to be detected using conventional methods. We have presented
a detection scheme which can self-adaptively detect both non-stealthy and stealthy attacks. The
scheme comprises: determining two estimates of the state of the monitored system using the state
measurement data provided by the remote sensing system at two sequential data collection slots,
and determining bad data injection attacks by monitoring the measurement variations and state
changes between the two slots. Analytical and simulation results have shown that the proposed
scheme is efficient in terms of data attack classification and detection accuracy. Once the attack
type is known, the power system operators can prioritize their actions or resources to better
protect their systems: If the attacks are non-stealthy, the corresponding injected measurements
can be removed for another round of state estimation. If the attacks are stealthy, besides removing
the measurements, system operators need to change the power network topology, since the
measurement matrix has been known to the attacker. Effective action strategies to reduce the
risk of being continuous attacked will be left for future work.
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Fig. 1. A block architecture diagram of the power system, communication network, and control center of a smart grid. An
IEEE 9-bus system is chosen to illustrate the power system.
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive detection of data injection attacks
I. Initialization: i = 0, collect historical estimated state vector.
II. Repeat the procedure for detecting bad data injection attacks:
1: Update i← i + 1;
2: Obtain current measurement vector zi;
3: Calculate the measurement change vector wi;
4: Estimate the state change ∆xˆi using the weighted least-square method;
5: Calculate the measurement change residual ri;
6: Identify and classify data attacks:
if the Euclidean norm of ri is larger than τ1 then
report non-stealthy data injection attack and exit
else if the Euclidean norm of ∆xˆi is larger than τ2 then
report stealthy data injection attack and exit
else make the decision of no attack, obtain the estimated state xˆi; update the last-time-slot
estimated state xˆi−1 = xˆi, and continue the state estimation process
III. Until non-stealthy or stealthy data injection attack is determined.
IV. Terminate the attack detection process and report the detected data injection attack to system
operators.
V. System operators distinguish between data injection attacks and electrical accidents.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Probability of false alarm
(b)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
d
e
te
c
ti
o
n
Proposed detection scheme
Non-stealthy attack, ANR=10dB
Stealthy attack, ANR=10dB
Non-stealthy attack, ANR=12dB
Stealthy attack, ANR=12dB
Non-stealthy attack, ANR=6dB
Stealthy attack, ANR=6dB
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Probability of false alarm
(a)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
 o
f 
d
e
te
c
ti
o
n
Conventional detection method
Non-stealthy attack, ANR=10dB
Stealthy attack, ANR=10dB
Fig. 2. Performance comparison of the proposed detection scheme and conventional detection method for IEEE 9-bus test
system, where SNR = 20 dB is considered.
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Fig. 3. Performance of the proposed detection scheme for IEEE 14-bus test system (SNR = 20 dB and various values of ANR
are considered).
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Fig. 4. Performance comparison of the proposed detection scheme and conventional detection method for IEEE 57-bus test
system (SNR = 20 dB and various values of ANR are considered).
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